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The Evolution of a Climate Regime: Kyoto to Marrakech
Mustafa H. Babiker, Henry D. Jacoby, John M. Reilly and David M. Reiner
Abstract
At meetings in Bonn and Marrakech in 2001, the Conference of the Parties to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change broke through an impasse on the detailed provisions needed to allow
the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force. Key ingredients in the breakthrough included U.S. withdrawal
from the process, an effective relaxation of emissions targets for Japan, Canada, and Russia, and
provision of access to unrestricted emissions trading. We analyze the costs of implementation and the
environmental effectiveness of the Bonn-Marrakech agreement, and its effect on the relative roles of
CO2 vs. non-CO2 greenhouse gases. The ability of the major sellers of permits, notably Russia and
Ukraine, to restrict access to permits, and the ability to trade across all greenhouse gases controlled
under the Protocol, are both found to have a significant effect for both costs and effectiveness. Finally,
the implications of the agreement for the future evolution of the climate regime are explored.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In November 2000, at The Hague, the sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) dissolved in an acrimonious
dispute—between the European Union and a group that included the United States, Japan,
Russia, Canada, and others—over the terms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. The following
July, at a resumed COP-6 bis held in Bonn, a political agreement was reached that in principle
resolved the issues that had led to the earlier breakdown. The way was thus paved for the
drafting of the technical language needed to allow ratification and implementation of the
agreement, a process completed at COP-7 in November 2001 in Marrakech. What had changed
between The Hague and Bonn that allowed the Protocol to move forward? What seemed to help
was the fact that the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases was sitting on the sidelines. In
March 2001, and again in July, the new U.S. administration had declared the Protocol fatally
flawed, and said it was unwilling to consider ratification or even to negotiate further on its terms.
2To be sure, several steps remain before the Protocol can enter into force, but the Bonn-
Marrakech agreement was a substantial and, to these observers at least, surprising
accomplishment considering the earlier difficulties. Next must come ratification by the requisite
combination of parties: 55 nations, including sufficient nations to amount to 55% of Annex I
carbon dioxide emissions in 1990 (Annex I consists of the OECD as of 1992, Eastern and Central
Europe, Russia and Ukraine). Since the Protocol has, of this writing, been ratified by 46 nations
(UNFCCC, 2001a), and the fifteen member states of the E.U. have indicated their commitment to
ratify it in 2002, the key obstacle to entry into force is the percentage target. Since the U.S. by
itself accounted for 36% of 1990 emissions, Japan or Russia alone is large enough to constitute
an effective veto. The leverage this fact gives to them, and to other smaller developed nations
such as Canada, helps explain the dramatic shift between The Hague and Bonn.
In addition to entry into force, a number of key issues remain to be resolved that could
substantially undermine the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol. These include
resolution of compliance issues deferred to the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP) after entry
into force, establishment of the boards and committees needed to administer various provisions
of the protocol, and negotiation of commitments for a second commitment period.
Perhaps more important than the negotiated international agreement is what transpires
domestically. The parties accepting the Protocol will need to implement domestic polices to
bring them into compliance, carry out the specified procedure for expert review of performance
and certification, and (if needed) impose any penalties agreed for parties failing to meet their
obligations. The international agreement simply reviews the achievements of a party and
potentially penalizes it for non-compliance. Actual emissions result from the activities of firms
and individuals within a country. Domestic implementation thus requires each party to develop
a regulatory compliance and review mechanism consistent with its political, judicial, and
regulatory structures that actually brings about the needed reductions.
There is a chance, of course, that failure of ratification or deadlock on compliance issues may
still derail the Protocol. Also, further interpretation of the agreement may substantially change
the nature of each party’s commitments, as we understand them now. Some of us outside the
negotiations have also been surprised by the wide range of interpretations of what at first seemed
straightforward Protocol language. We have, however, made our best attempt to interpret the text
as it now stands (UNFCCC, 2001b), and we seek here to assess its economic and environmental
implications, assuming that the resolve shown by the Parties in Bonn and Marrakech will propel
them forward to ratification and entry into force.
We address several questions. What are the environmental and economic implications of the
agreement? That is, what level of emissions reductions does it require, and what level of effort
would be needed to achieve them? We also take up the challenge posed by the glaring hole in the
agreement, namely, what are the implications for possible future efforts to seek convergence
between the Kyoto regime and whatever approach the United States may ultimately take?
32. EVENTS ON THE ROAD TO MARRAKECH
2.1 The Original Kyoto Plan
Perhaps it is foolhardy to attempt to reconstruct the Kyoto Protocol as agreed in 1997,
particularly considering the four years of conflict over its interpretation that followed.1 What is
clear is that the Kyoto Protocol established national emissions reduction targets, for a single
five-year averaging period, 2008-2012, for nations listed in Annex B to the Protocol, offered the
beginnings of the accounting procedures needed to establish compliance and provided a general
description of various mechanisms to allow flexibility intended to reduce the overall cost of
compliance. These mechanisms included “bubbles” within which several countries could meet
their obligations jointly, a facility for crediting emissions reducing projects in other Annex B
nations (Joint Implementation or JI), a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to generate
credits for investing in projects in developing nations that had not assumed constraints under
Annex B, and a system of trading in emissions permits among Annex B nations. Six categories
of gases were specified, and at the same session the parties agreed to the100-year IPCC Global
Warming Potentials (GWPs) for their comparison and aggregation, allowing larger reductions in
one category to offset lesser reductions in another. Less clear were provisions that were added to
allow sinks from forests and possibly agricultural soils to offset the emissions reductions agreed.
Negotiations leading up to Kyoto had called for agreement on policies and measures (i.e., not
just targets to be met but specific actions to be taken), but these did not survive, significantly on
opposition from the U.S.
Having set national targets and a timetable, and inserted these other features, the negotiators
returned home declaring victory in the establishment of an international climate control regime.
The expectation was that, if put into force, the first commitment period would see the Annex B
parties reduce their emissions to roughly 5% below 1990 levels. Unfortunately, though it was
possible to pick the reduction percentages and outline flexibility mechanisms, it was more
difficult to define what they might mean in practice. A number of contentious issues were left
for subsequent negotiation under a Buenos Aires Plan of Action negotiated in COP-4 in 1998.
The key battles centered on whether there would be limits on the use of the mechanisms, and
what other restrictions might be imposed in selecting projects or in the details of trading across
sources or among gases. The concept behind JI and CDM was clear enough, but important
details, such as what types of projects would be admissible, were not. Sinks had been added into
the text in two articles: Article 3.3 which covered land use and forestry projects initiated since
1990, and Article 3.4 which introduced pre-existing biological sinks. These articles were written
in such a way that conflicted parties could interpret the language in widely differing ways
(Schlamdinger and Marland, 2000). In the final hours, after a fierce debate, the United States and
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 For a description written before COP-6 and the Bonn-Marrakech agreements, see Grubb et al. (1999). We focus
here on the national targets and timetables and their implementation although there are, of course, many other
features—such as reporting requirements, adaptation aid and other compensation, capacity building, and
technology transfer—that are significant parts of the larger agreement, but are not of concern in this assessment.
4its allies managed to secure the inclusion of emissions trading in the face of widespread
skepticism or outright hostility towards the concept.
Although the U.S. and the larger Umbrella Group2 argued strenuously for a generous
interpretation of sinks and emissions trading to alleviate burdens, the dominant view within Europe
was that their use should be limited. This led to a contentious battle over Article 3.4 sinks and
over “supplementarity”—i.e., the limits on the degree to which a party’s reduction commitment
could be met through the various flexibility mechanisms (Ellerman and Sue Wing, 2000).
Finally, the 1997 text delayed consideration of compliance, only specifying the need to
develop an “indicative list” of consequences at the MOP, and that the Protocol ultimately would
need to be amended to provide “binding consequences” for non-compliance.
2.2 Changes On the Way to Marrakech
In the negotiations under the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, many issues not emphasized here
were dealt with, but the parties remained deadlocked on the difficult questions of CDM, sinks,
supplementarity, and compliance. COP-6 in The Hague began with some 250 pages of bracketed
text. The plan was for the diplomats to clean up that text during the first week, leaving only the
key political choices to be decided by the ministers, due to arrive in the second week. As in the
lead-up negotiations, the lower-level diplomats did not have the authority to remove the brackets,
and the negotiations bogged down. To quote one observer, the problem in The Hague was that,
“The first week was too political for the technicians, and the second week was then too technical
for the politicians.” Toward the end of the session, the President of the Conference, Dutch
Environment Minister Jan Pronk, put forth a short compromise document, attempting to close
the gap on the major political questions. In the final 36 hours of bargaining, negotiations among
the more than 150 parties represented there boiled down to a deadlock between the United States
(supported by the Umbrella Group) and the European Union. At the point of collapse in
disagreement and recrimination the main deal breakers were the same ones it had been
impossible to resolve in Kyoto three years earlier: supplementarity and sinks. Not wanting to
admit defeat, the meeting was “suspended” rather than adjourned. A meeting to resolve the
differences was held in Ottawa immediately following the debacle in The Hague, but it quickly
dissolved in conflict as well.
With the new U.S. administration’s refusal to negotiate, the environment shifted dramatically.
Ironically, removal of the U.S. from the process both increased the commitment of the remaining
parties to reach agreement, and freed up the negotiators to accept provisions they had opposed
when the U.S. was viewed as the principal beneficiary. COP-6 bis in July 2001 started from an
updated version of the earlier Pronk memo. In the subsequent negotiations, any requirement of
supplementarity was dropped completely. Moreover, Article 3.4 sinks, earlier sought by the
United States and others in the Umbrella Group and opposed so strenuously by the E.U., were
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 The Umbrella Group was a loose coalition that included the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia, Norway and New
Zealand, and later came to include Russia and Ukraine.
5freely allocated to Canada, Japan, and Russia. The quantities given in the Bonn compromise
(detailed in Table 2 below) totaled 54 million metric tons of carbon (MMtC). In effect, these
countries were allowed to reduce their Kyoto targets using this mechanism, a move bitterly
criticized when the U.S. tried to introduce these credits in The Hague.
In addition to the resolution of a number of nettlesome technical details, the final text reached
in Marrakech included agreement to a request by Russia for another 15.4 MMtC of Article 3.4
sinks, adding to the substantial quantity of hot air already available in the first commitment
period. As in Bonn, countries such as Russia and Japan, and to a lesser extent Canada, were in a
strong bargaining position in relation to the E.U. and others who had opposed these “do nothing”
sinks. Finally, COP-7 agreed to a compliance penalty involving suspension of eligibility to use
the flexibility mechanisms and a deduction of any first-period shortfall from the (still to be
negotiated) allocation for the second commitment period, using a multiplier of 1.3. It is, in effect,
a borrowing provision with an interest rate of just over 5 percent per annum. On the insistence of
Japan and others, provisions were included for reinstatement of eligibility, and the legal text on
compliance was delayed, to be taken up by the MOP after the Protocol has entered into force.
3. COMPUTING THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING PROVISIONS
3.1 The MIT EPPA Model
To evaluate the implications of these changing features of the Protocol we apply the MIT
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. It is a recursive-dynamic multi-
regional general equilibrium model of the world economy developed for analysis of climate
change policy (Babiker et al., 2001a). The version of EPPA used here is built on a
comprehensive energy-economy data set (GTAP4-E) that accommodates a consistent
representation of energy markets in physical units as well as detailed accounts of regional
production and bilateral trade flows (Hertel, 1997).3 The base year for the model is 1995 and it is
solved recursively at 5-year intervals. In the reporting of results below, the year 2010 is used to
represent the 2008-2012 commitment period.
For purposes of this assessment, a significant feature of the model is the inclusion of the cost
of abatement of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) as
described by Hyman (2001). Calculations shown below take account of these gases, using the
100-year IPCC GWPs as relative weights. The cost calculations consider both the emissions
mitigation that occurs as a byproduct of actions directed at CO2, and reductions resulting from
gas-specific control measures. Targeted control measures include reductions in the emissions of:
CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels; the industrial gases that replace CFCs controlled by the
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 Aside from the full inclusion of the non-CO2 gases (see below) changes from the version documented by Babiker
et al. (2001a) include: (1) updating of oil and gas resources to be consistent with a recent USGS re-evaluation
(USGS, 2000); (2) revision of the electric sector, including separation of hydroelectricity from other
conventional sources based on IEA data (IEA, 2001), reformulation of the backstop renewable electric sector,
and addition of a biomass electric generation technology; and (3) revision of China’s energy and emissions
outlook to be consistent with reports of recent trends.
6Montreal Protocol and produced at aluminum smelters; CH4 from energy supply and use, large
landfills, and sewage; and N2O from chemical production. Limited reduction possibilities from
agriculture also are included for control of CH4 from manure management in large concentrated
livestock operations, and N2O reductions from the improved management of inorganic fertilizer
applications. Because of a lack of proven technologies and/or the difficulty of measurement and
monitoring we do not consider reductions in process CO2 from cement production, N2O from
organic nitrogen application and fossil fuel combustion, or CH4 from small landfills, ruminant
digestion, and manure management on small farms. The effects of human emissions on
tropospheric ozone, and the influence of the various carbon aerosols, also are not considered in
the analysis, as these substances are not included in the Kyoto framework.
Non-energy activities are aggregated to three sectors, as shown in Table 1. The energy sector,
which contributes to emissions of several of the non-CO2 gases as well as to CO2 itself, is
modeled in more detail. The synthetic coal gas industry produces a perfect substitute for natural
gas. The oil shale industry produces a perfect substitute for refined oil. These “backstop”
technologies do not enter in the 2010 time period analyzed here. All electricity generation
technologies produce perfectly substitutable electricity except for the “Solar&Wind” technology,
which is modeled as producing an imperfect substitute, reflecting its intermittent output.
The regional and sectoral disaggregation also is shown in Table 1. The disaggregation of
Annex B into six nations or multi-nation groups is seen in the analysis below. Under this EPPA
aggregation the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are taken to represent those
economies that are in Annex B and thereby assuming a Kyoto commitment (principally Russia
and Ukraine). This aggregation is not exact, but the difference does not have a significant effect
on the results below, or the conclusions to be drawn from them.4
3.2 The Crucial Role of the Non-CO2 Gases and Hot Air
Before proceeding to the details of post-Kyoto developments, it is useful to highlight the
influence of two features of the agreement, multiple gases and hot air, in a simpler if hypothetical
context where all Annex B parties participate and the reduction targets are as agreed in Kyoto but
without carbon sinks or CDM credits. As demonstrated by Reilly et al. (1999) and Reilly, Jacoby
and Prinn (2002), consideration of the non-CO2 gases has a substantial effect on environmental
performance and control costs, as compared with model calculations limited to CO2 only. In
Figure 1, we summarize both the effects of their inclusion and the combined effect of an all-gas
policy with emissions trading that includes access to Russian and Ukrainian hot air. The figure
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 In the aggregation of the GTAP database used here, the FSU includes not only Russia and Ukraine, Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia (which are included in Annex B) but Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan which are not. The total carbon-equivalent
emissions of these excluded regions are presently only a small portion of the FSU aggregate (their fossil carbon
emissions are about 20% of those of the FSU in 1995). In addition, at COP-7 Kazakhstan, which makes up 5-
10% of the FSU total joined Annex I and indicated its intention to assume an Annex B target. The EET (Eastern
Europe) also includes a number of former Yugoslav republics and Albania which are not included in Annex B,
which contribute only a small percentage of overall EET emissions.
7Table 1. Countries, Regions, and Sectors in the General Equilibrium Model
Country or Region Sectors
Annex B Non-Energy
United States (USA) Agriculture
Japan (JPN) Energy Intensive products
European Union (EEC) Other Industries products
Other OECD (OOE) Energy
Former Soviet Union (FSU) Coal
Eastern Europe (EET) Crude Oil
Non-Annex B Natural Gas
India Electric: Fossil, Nuclear, Hydro
Brazil Solar&Wind, Biomass
Energy Exporting Economies Refined Oil
Dynamic Asian Economies Synthetic Gas from Coal
Rest of World Oil from Shale
China
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Figure 1. Carbon-Equivalent Price Under the Kyoto Protocol, With the U.S. Participating
shows the four Annex B regions that would be under restraint under the original Kyoto
definitions (i.e., with the U.S. participating).
Taking the U.S. as an example, and assuming no emissions trading, the first bar in the figure
shows that a CO2-only implementation of the 7% U.S. Kyoto reduction (i.e., CO2 only in the
base-year emissions and in the 2010 target quantity) requires an emissions price of over $350 per
ton of carbon (tC). Shifting to a cost-minimizing all-gas approach (i.e., including all gases in the
base year and in the 2010 projection) lowers the required price substantially, to around $250 per
ton. Similar effects are shown for the other three regions. The lower price is attributable to the
fact that some of the non-CO2 gases offer relatively cheap opportunities for abatement,
particularly when considered in carbon-equivalent terms with GWPs ranging from 21 for CH4 to
24,000 for SF6.5
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 The calculations shown here use the GWPs in the IPCC Second Assessment Report. They have been changed
somewhat in the Third Assessment Report.
8The figure also shows the effect of adding emissions trading, and the dramatic effect of the
hot air available in Russia and Ukraine. Under the EPPA reference emissions projection used
here, the excess of their allocation, over and above our reference projection of emissions in 2010,
is 230 MMtC.6 This is a large number in relation to the reductions required by the four regions
shown, and the introduction of emissions trading and free sale of hot air drops the carbon price
for the participating countries to around $150 per ton, even in a calculation that does not consider
the relatively cost-effective opportunities available among the non-CO2 gases. When the
assumed policy includes not only the trading and hot air but the non-CO2 gases as well, the
clearing price falls below $50 per ton C. The effects of multiple gases and hot air play a large
role in the change from these “early Kyoto” conditions to the conditions in place after
Marrakech, presented below.
From this point on we will focus on our stylized Kyoto case, which includes all six gases.
However, there are other potentially cost-reducing features of the Protocol that we do not
consider. We do not include possible sinks credits under Article 3.3 that accounts for sinks
generated by activities started after 1990.7 Also, we do not take account of possible credits
gained through the CDM. The omission of these features contributes an upward bias to our
estimates of the clearing price for carbon emissions.
On the other hand, there are features of the calculation that tend to yield an underestimate.
First, it is far from clear that a full trading system can be put in place by 2010, so its advantages
are likely overstated for the Kyoto first commitment period. Also, governments are not likely to
implement policies that are as efficient as an EPPA-type model assumes. Of course, the effect of
an “inefficient” policy depends on the circumstance. In some situations seemingly less-than-ideal
policies may be almost as good or better in economic terms than a cap-and-trade policy or
uniform carbon tax. Pre-existing imperfections or distortions that affect economic decision-
making can interact with new policies introduced into the economy.8
On balance, however, possibilities of wasteful policies probably dominate, so that the results
likely understate the carbon-equivalent prices that would actually be required to meet the targets.
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 All these estimates are uncertain, but the pace of Russian economic recovery and thus the level of hot air is
particularly so. For example, our reference estimate is below that of the  Department of Energy’s Energy
Information Administration, which puts the level at 261 MMtC in its reference case (EIA, 2000, Table 22).
7
 We also do not account for the effects of Article 3.7 of the Protocol, which establishes a separate accounting
scheme for countries with net positive land-use emissions. Australia is the only Annex B country to qualify, and
the provision is estimated to add 19% to that country’s target (Hamilton and Vellen, 1999).
8
 For example, Babiker et al. (2001b) show that exempting transportation fuels from a carbon tax, for at least some
countries in Europe where gasoline taxes are already high, can improve welfare compared with the case where
they are not exempted. In another example, Babiker, Reilly and Ellerman (2000) demonstrate that a nuclear
subsidy in Japan is not nearly as distortionary as might be expected, because existing electricity prices are higher
than is economically efficient. A nuclear subsidy, by partly offsetting the high electricity prices, is almost as
efficient as a comparable carbon cap-and-trade system introduced on top of the existing energy price structure.
94. THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE PROTOCOL
4.1 Targets, Performance, and Costs
The years of negotiation since COP-3 in Kyoto have brought both clarification of the Protocol
language, and what some would view as changes in its original intent. This evolution affects both
the environmental performance of the agreement and the likely costs of implementation. As a
measure of performance, we use the reduction in carbon-weighted greenhouse emissions from
their levels in 2000. Much of the discussion of expected achievements under the Protocol uses
1990 as a base, but the final decisions on provisions, and the initiation of programs to achieve the
agreed reductions, all take place around the year 2000 and after. It is the achievement from today
that is at issue, and changes brought about primarily by political events and differential growth
rates over the previous decade only serve to obscure what is at issue. For an indicator of the cost,
we use the carbon-equivalent price of emissions that is implicit in the imposed emissions
restriction.
The performance and cost of the various versions of the agreement are presented in Figure 2.
The horizontal axis shows the reductions below 2000 levels for the aggregate of the European
Union (EEC), Japan (JPN) and the other OECD countries (OOE), under various assumptions
about the agreement and country behavior. The vertical axis is the carbon price in 1995 dollars
per ton, carbon-equivalent. Carbon prices are plotted for the three EPPA regions that remain
under some restraint after the U.S. has dropped out. When a trading regime is in place, the price
is the same for all, a group denoted “Kyoto 3.”
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Figure 2. Required Emissions Change in Relation to 2000 and Carbon-Equivalent Prices for the
E.U., Japan, and the other OECD countries (% of reduction from CO2 in parentheses)
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If the original Kyoto targets were imposed under the definitions as they stood before COP-6,
and if (other than the E.U. bubble) no international exchange of emissions trading were allowed,
then the three regions in Figure 2 would be required to achieve a reduction of emissions below
the 2000 level, by the 2008-2012 commitment period, of about 14%. Prices would differ among
regions because of their differential growth rates, different mixes of gases within their total
emissions, and varying opportunities for mitigation. The carbon-equivalent price in the European
Union and the other OECD countries would be somewhat over $100 per ton C, whereas the price
in Japan would be approximately twice that amount. (The United States, not shown here, would
experience a price similar to that in Japan were it to adopt its Kyoto target under these
assumptions). The addition of permit trading, in an imagined pre-COP-6 world in which the
United States was meeting its target and Russian hot air was freely offered on the market, would
yield a reduction below 2000 levels by the non-U.S. group by slightly over 2%.9 Also,
duplicating the results for this case shown in Figure 1, the equilibrium price in carbon-equivalent
terms would fall to below $50, even with the United States participating.
The events between The Hague and Marrakech combine to change these results dramatically.
Not only is there abandonment by the U.S. but also the granting of the Article 3.4 sinks, shown
in Table 2, relaxes the targets substantially. Most restraints on trading were lifted, most notably
the requirement of supplementarity. The Marrakech text includes language regarding a
commitment period reserve, whereby countries must demonstrate via a recent inventory that they
indeed have made reductions, and are not selling credits they are not likely to have when the end-
of-period accounting is done. We assume that this mechanism works so that targets are met, but
that it does not substantially limit the amount of credits that can be sold. It might occur that steep
emissions reductions in the last year or two of the commitment period might not be verifiable in
time to sell these credits. However, there is a three-month true-up period after the end of the
commitment period. Thus while this feature of the agreement may place some limits on trading,
we believe its effect would be minor and we ignore it in the analysis.
Here we show two different outcomes of the Marrakech agreement, differing according to the
behavior of Russia and Ukraine. First, if all the Russian and Ukrainian hot air were made
Table 2. Sinks Allowed in the Bonn and Marrakech Agreements
Region COP Amount (MMtC)
EEC 6 bis 5.2
OOE 6 bis 13.1
EET 6 bis 3.8
JPN 6 bis 13.0
FSU 6 bis 19.5
FSU 7 15.4
Total 7 69.9
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 For the reader accustomed to seeing Kyoto targets in relation to a 1990 base year, this case, which includes the
influence of the hot air, yields the familiar 5% reduction.
11
available on a “free trade” basis, and if the countries of Annex B made full use of the additional
Article 3.4 sinks granted in Bonn and Marrakech, then emissions in 2010 would not be required
to be below the 2000 level, but would only be limited to be no more than around 9% growth.
The calculated carbon-equivalent price falls to below $5 per ton C. The agreement is still binding
under this forecast, but only barely.10 The result is broadly consistent with other studies of the
agreement by Manne and Richels (2001), Nordhaus (2001), Den Elzen and de Moor (2001), and
Bohringer (2001).
Of course, the credibility of a permit trading schemes depends on the magnitude of the
implied financial transfers, a point to which we will return below. As a basis for judgment about
these matters, Table 3 presents the value of permit purchases and sales in the year 2010, stated in
billions of 1995 U.S. dollars. In the pre-COP-6 case with trading the flows are very large, with
an annual transfer from the U.S. to Russia and Ukraine of near $20 billion dollars. The fact total
U.S. overseas development assistance to all countries in 1999 was only $9 billion, and had
declined at a rate of some 4% per year through the 1990s (OECD, 2001), raises serious questions
about the realism of the Kyoto Protocol, even if the U.S. would have been willing to go along
on other grounds. On the other hand, under the Marrakech terms with free trade, Russian and
Ukrainian net revenue drops to around $500 million, with smaller flows to the Eastern European
states (EET).
The observation that Russia and Ukraine would be, by far, the largest sellers of permits leads
to the second case. It is reasonable to expect that Russia and Ukraine would not put all their
available permits on the market, but would try to maximize revenue by forming a cartel—a sort
of climate OPEC as denoted in the figure. Assuming they could operate effectively to maximize
revenues (or national welfare, which leads to roughly the same level of permit sales), the
increase in Annex B emissions between 2000 and 2010 would be held to approximately the
year-2000 level, with a carbon-equivalent price of around $25 per ton C. Their permit revenues
would increase by a factor of 6, to around $3 billion per year. Of course their degree of market
power would depend on the behavior of the Eastern European countries (EET in the EPPA
aggregation). We believe that, because of their desire for integration into the E.U., it is unlikely
that these countries would actively participate in any such cartel arrangement. In fact, E.U.
Table 3. Annual Value of Permit Purchases (+) and Sales (–), $1995 Billions
Region Pre COP-6  Trade COP-7 Free Trade COP-7 OPEC
USA 16.2
JPN 2.3 0.11 1.2
EEC 4.1 0.35 3.1
OOE 2.5 0.19 1.6
FSU –19.9 –0.50 –3.0
EET –5.2 –0.13 –2.9
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 Note this is all the agreement requires these countries to do. They may indeed take more substantial action, of
which more later.
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enlargement will bring several of these countries within the E.U. bubble. If that assumption is
correct, then (like the other OPEC) Russia and Ukraine would face a problem of free-riding.
As shown in Table 3, the EET region would benefit almost as much as the OPEC participants,
increasing their revenues to near $3 billion per year as well. Of course, entry into the E.U. for
some of these countries may involve a revision of the E.U. burden-sharing agreement—in principal
the E.U. could reallocate hot air of countries that enter as part of E.U. enlargement to other E.U.
members. The current burden-sharing arrangement appears likely to result in greater difficulties
for some current E.U. countries than others in meeting their targets (Viguier et al., 2001).
The Protocol provision that allows banking of permits for subsequent commitment periods
might exert an additional restraint on permit sales by Russia and Ukraine (Manne and Richels,
2001), but we do not consider it in the calculations shown here. Studies of this prospect require
assumptions about (1) whether there will be a second commitment period under current rules,
(2) if so, how stringent the targets will be, and (3) whether the U.S. and other Umbrella group
countries will participate and the stringency of their targets. These matters may be largely
resolved before decisions must be made about ultimate permit transfers in the first commitment
period, but many intermediate decisions about transfers would need to be made before then.
Also, a Russian-Ukrainian oligopoly would already have a large carryover of permits (about 50%
of their first-period hot air or 115 MMtC under our reference case) and the risk discount would
likely be high. The joint effect of cartel action and banking is a fruitful topic for further analysis,
but we would not expect a substantial effect on the character of the results presented.
4.2 The Changing Role of Non-CO2 Gases
A final aspect to note about the evolution from Kyoto to Marrakech is the change in the
focus of mitigation activity. By our analysis, a cost-effective response to the Bonn-Marrakech
agreement is achieved almost exclusively through the reduction of non-CO2 greenhouse gases.
The numbers in parentheses in Figure 2 indicate the percentage of overall reductions derived
from fossil carbon. Under the pre-COP-6 conditions with no permit trade, 55% of the reductions
(measured from the EPPA projection of 2010 emissions) would come from CO2. The addition of
permit trade lowers the CO2 role to 36%. Under COP-7 conditions and unrestricted trade, the
contribution of CO2 to the cost-minimizing reduction strategy would be a mere 4%! If, however,
Russia and Ukraine were able to form an effective cartel in emissions permits, this would raise
the CO2 fraction to around 30%. This result is consistent with early experience in the German
emissions control program. A recent study of emissions since 1990 found that reductions came
mainly from CO2, but that the majority of the CO2 cuts came about as a result of reunification
(so-called wall-fall profits), whereas reductions in non-CO2 greenhouse gases arose primarily
from actual policy measures (Schleich et al., 2001).
4.3 Conclusions About the Current State of the Protocol
While predicting the future is always dangerous, there is no sign the U.S. administration will
change its mind about the Kyoto Protocol. Further, it is implausible to imagine that the nations
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that remain within the Kyoto framework would not make full use of the facilities they fought for
at Bonn and Marrakech. Russia will seek to maximize revenues from its excess credits, and
Japan and Canada will make full use of Article 3.4 sinks credits in their implementation plans.
Therefore, the final Bonn-Marrakech agreement, while superficially similar to the original Kyoto
text, is substantially different for all Parties. Absent the U.S., the Bonn-Marrakech agreement is
close to non-binding if all of the flexibility mechanisms are used. In this regard, it is worth
noting that EPPA reference projections assume robust GDP and energy growth. If the current
slow economic growth in Europe and Japan persists for a few more years then the reference
projections of emissions used here would be too high, and only slightly slower growth in
emissions would indeed make the cap non-binding.
A remaining issue is whether a trading system will be designed in the E.U., Russia, Ukraine
and elsewhere that will allow market access to the hot air across multiple sectors and nations.
More likely than a private trading system may be quota trading among countries, and these quota
trades may not involve cash transfers but political considerations such as support for IMF loans,
entry into NATO or the E.U., or strategic energy agreements. Moreover, as already noted some
of the Eastern European nations may have entered the E.U. by the end of the first commitment
period, and thus any hot air in these countries could automatically count toward an expanded
E.U. bubble target.
In many respects, then, the Protocol appears to have evolved back to the looser commitment
of Article 2 of the Framework Convention, only with less ambitious reduction goals. The FCCC
had the “aim” of returning within ten years to 1990 emissions levels. (Even then most nations
failed to meet their targets, the most notable exceptions being Germany by dent of unification
and Britain as a result of the “dash to gas”). For those parties shown in Figure 2 the Bonn-
Marrakech agreement would, by our reference forecast, allow a 9% emissions growth from 2000
to 2010. Thus these countries can pursue independent policies and measures, including a large
dependence on voluntary schemes, achieve some modest reductions, and remain relatively
assured that there will be enough hot air available so that any shortfall can be covered by a
political agreement during the true-up period. The chance of facing the embarrassment of
non-compliance is small.
5. WHAT NEXT IN THE EVOLUTION?
In the interregnum, while the U.S. is tentatively seeking its own approach to the climate
issue and other nations are considering ratification and developing domestic legislation to
implement the Protocol, it is useful to think about what may come next in the evolution of the
international regime. What the U.S. ultimately decides to do, and how soon it gets about it, will
have international repercussions. But also it matters how the Kyoto-Marrakech result comes to
be viewed and, whether viewed as a success or a failure, what lessons are drawn from the
experience as a guide to future development.
Given the huge international effort that has gone into the Kyoto negotiations, and the
importance of the Protocol to the larger “project” of European unification, there will be many
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incentives for the nations that ratify the Protocol to claim success. Viewed in a generous light,
the less-ambitious targets are perhaps more in line with what is appropriate in a first commitment
period. Even with its likely modest environmental achievements and low cost, implementation of
the Protocol in the first commitment period offers an opportunity to refine its various elements,
so that the agreement and its subsidiary institutions might be more effective in future periods.
With some measure of success in meeting emissions reduction targets, countries might be willing
to negotiate tighter targets for succeeding commitment periods and/or tighten the definitions for
the first period developed at Marrakech. Some countries clearly intend to do more than the
minimum that would be required as the Protocol now stands, and some may even choose to meet
the original first-period targets without the many degrees of flexibility afforded them. Others
understandably prefer not to risk compliance penalties by agreeing to commitments they are not
sure they can meet, but may still move aggressively because of domestic pressures for action.
Thus the agreement may lead to real reductions beyond those described in our analysis. If the
Protocol comes into force and is viewed in this positive light, it will be difficult to envisage
substantial changes in the architecture when nations constrained under Kyoto seek to expand
the agreement to the U.S. and Non-Annex B parties in future commitment periods.
Of course, to return the regime to the spirit rather than the letter of targets-and-timetables
would require moving towards targets (or rules) with real bite. Even without renegotiating the
Annex B targets, a strengthening would occur if the U.S. were to enter the Protocol in the
second commitment period. This turn-about seems unlikely even under the most favorable
circumstances (which many believe would be a Democrat-controlled Congress and White House
in 2004). Without the U.S., the E.U. and other parties are even less likely, on competitiveness
concerns, to impose stringent economy-wide constraints.
On the other hand, therefore, Kyoto may ultimately be viewed as a failure, because the
Protocol promises to achieve so little in the first commitment period in spite of government
rhetoric that has led many in the public, the press, and the environmental movement to acclaim
Kyoto, and even Bonn-Marrakech, as a major environmental achievement. It is useful to recall
that, in the lead-up to the Kyoto agreement and subsequently, an expectation was created that
anything short of an absolute decline in emissions from an historical base year would certainly
be a failure. Those few countries, such as Australia, that negotiated a target greater than its 1990
emissions were widely seen among the environmental community of having agreed to less than
nothing. It would seem to take a considerable reframing of the political discussion for either the
environmental community or the developing countries to come to view increased emissions from
current levels in most of the Annex I countries as the signal of success. Indeed, despite the
Protocol language that supposes binding international targets, the post-Marrakech agreement
retains very little that would constrain national emissions. The nations ratifying the Protocol
have in fact moved into a largely domestically-determined world of “policies and measures,”
organized behind the façade of an international “targets and timetables” agreement.11
                                                 
11
 It is a further irony that the U.S., having opposed policies and measures prior to Kyoto, now appears to be
operating in this mode as well, albeit with technology development as its principal “measure” (Watson, 2001).
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If emissions trajectories continue their upward trend even after the first commitment period, the
question will be, what went wrong? An easy answer, of course, will be that the weak environmental
result is the fault of the U.S. The main Kyoto arrangements, importantly including the provisions
creating the Russian hot air, were predicated on an agreement with the U.S. participating, and when
the U.S. withdrew after COP-6, the inertia of the negotiations and the newfound leverage of Japan
and Russia meant that the non-U.S. Umbrella group were able to extract more than they had been
asking for at COP-6, when the overall costs would have been much steeper.
It would be unfortunate, however, if U.S. withdrawal clouded thinking about other lessons
that could be learned. A more modest view, and one consistent with the history of international
agreements, is that it is unlikely that countries will ever commit to an agreement where the costs
are uncertain and possibly quite large (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996). In this view, it is not
surprising that, one way or another, the agreement ended up with targets unlikely to seriously
constrain emissions. Were this to be the lesson drawn, future negotiations would seek to avoid
arrangements that imposed restrictions that were unresponsive to differential rates of economic
growth, or that contained features (like the hot air) that create big and hard-to-predict differences
among adherents in the cost of compliance. These are features of any target set back in history.
Thoughtful reflection on ways around this situation is essential because developing countries
considering accession in later commitment periods will inevitably want to receive an allocation
as generous as that received by Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.
In the logic of Kyoto, the inequity of these differentials was to be moderated by free use of
international permit trading, but the system seems unlikely to be credible. By creating very
different 2010 emissions gaps to be closed, the Protocol would have implied large financial
transfers, as shown in Table 3. The available economic studies have not been particularly helpful
in their representation of these trading options. Most analysis has focused on the efficiency of
an international trading system given an allocation of permits. While the analysis might be
technically correct, these flows were not likely to prove politically sustainable, particularly when
a substantial portion of the funds would be paying for hot air. The idea that governments will
allocate permits in such a way that their citizens must first send abroad large amounts of money
to get them back as permits is most generously viewed as unrealistic. With this errant focus, and
the resulting bitter debate about supplementarity and sinks, other issues of real importance were
given less attention. For example, what forms should assistance take to Russia, the Economies in
Transition, and poor but industrializing countries such as China or India, to help them achieve
meaningful reductions in emissions without distorting their economic development priorities?
For many poor countries threatened by sea level rise or other adverse effects of climate change,
the question is how best to help them adapt.
Were such questioning of the Kyoto structure to take hold, other paths might open up. There
is much to recommend control regimes and associated agreements based on prices rather than
quantities, and some useful experiments are under way on CO2, particularly in Europe. To date,
however, we see no evidence of a taste for any serious, national effort, let alone international
discussions, on this basis. The nascent cap-and-trade systems could grow, in an organic fashion,
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into a larger network over time. But that process would likely be slow, because the current
efforts are so few and so limited. Most are defined downstream, for example, and (except within
the E.U. bubble) purposefully limited to domestic sources. Bolder national experiments may be
tried under the existing Protocol, perhaps involving parties on the fringes of Annex B, such as
Australia, Canada or Norway, but there are no such indications yet.
For the next few years, the focus of those parties supporting the Protocol will be on the
agreement they’ve got: on the ratification process, the creation of the Protocol institutions, and
the domestic policies needed even under the agreements now limited objectives. Reaching
consensus on success or failure will take a while, and so discussion of modifications in the
architecture will not get much attention. Having reached a delicate agreement it is hard to
imagine any way in which basic provisions of the Protocol would be reopened for discussion
among the existing Parties even if it many view it as an environmental failure. In this
circumstance, and despite the dubious current prospects for any serious U.S. climate policy, the
absence of the U.S. from the Protocol perhaps provides the only real possibility for some
genuinely new and perhaps necessary changes to be brought to the bargaining table. Certainly,
the parties who have agreed to the Protocol would not be expected to, nor should they, receive
well an entirely new international architecture proposal from the U.S. without some concrete
U.S. domestic actions commensurate with their own domestic policies. So, only after the U.S.
has settled on an approach and taken some domestic actions— perhaps totally inconsistent with
Kyoto, perhaps consistent with foreseeable modification—will progress come in knitting
together a more universally suitable, and sustainable, approach to the issue. But this may provide
the best opportunity to reconsider the international architecture of climate policy and revise those
features of the Protocol that made it political unsustainable as originally conceived.
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